With few exceptions, the literature on the role of capacity as a strategic entry deterrent has assumed Cournot competition in the post-entry game. In contrast, our model is in the spirit of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) : the incumbent and entrant sequentially precommit to capacity levels before competing in price. Interesting deterrence effects arise because firms need time to build, i.e. cannot adjust capacity instantaneously in the post-entry game. Depending on the sizes of the fixed set-up cost, the cost of capacity and the relative costs of production, our model produces a wide spectrum of equilibrium behaviors. Using a "reverse-judo" tactic a cost disadvantaged incumbent may limit his capacity to induce the entrant to respond less aggressively. When the incumbent is equally or more efficient, a stochastic version of Gelman and Salop's (1983) judo equilibrium may arise. Entry accommodation can also result in the Stackelberg outcome, or the equilibria from Dixit's (1980) quantity-setting game. In contrast to much previous work, we find that when entry is deterred the incumbent may hold idle capacity.
Introduction
Most theories of the determinants of industrial concentration assign an important role to scale economies, either at the plant or the firm level. However, U.S. manufacturing appears to be considerably more concentrated than would be warranted by scale economies alone. For example, in nine of the twelve industries examined by Scherer et al. (1975) , the market share of the top three firms in each industry ranges from two to ten times higher than the market share necessary to exploit scale economies (with an average of 4.4 over the whole sample). One possible explanation for this observed divergence is that strategic actions undertaken by incumbent firms can magnify the advantages conferred by scale economies. The literature on capacity as a strategic entry deterrent (surveyed below) advances such a theory: by building capacity in excess of what would be optimal in the absence of an entry threat, early incumbents can deter further entry, or at least reduce the scale of such entry. This paper uses the Bertrand-Edgeworth model of price competition to reexamine the role of capacity precommitment as an entry deterring device. More precisely, we assume that there are two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant (henceforth called the entrant), that compete in a market for a homogeneous good. The firms play a three-stage noncooperative game. First, the incumbent chooses its capacity. Having observed the incumbent's capacity level, the entrant then selects capacity. In the third stage, the firms simultaneously set prices. Allen (1993) first analyzed a game of this type. Our paper differs from Allen's (1993) analysis in two important ways. 1 First, we allow firms to have different unit costs of production up to capacity. This enables us to examine the role of differential efficiency in determining the nature of precommitment; with asymmetric efficiencies a firm may want to precommit to be large (as in Dixit (1980) ) or small (as in Gelman and Salop (1983) ). Second, we characterize the equilibrium for arbitrary (but identical) costs of capacity and fixed set up costs. A central theme 1 of our paper is that the distinction between fixed costs of entry, the cost of capacity, and the cost of production up to capacity is crucial to the understanding of a wide range of economic phenomena.
The contemporary analysis of entry deterrence can be seen as an outgrowth of the limit pricing model of Bain (1956) , Sylos-Labini (1969) , and Modigliani (1958) . According to Bain (1956, p. 98) , potential entrants act as if they expected that upon entry established firms would maintain output at the pre-entry level. 2 The decision whether to enter the industry is therefore based upon a comparison of the residual demand curve (industry output minus the pre-entry output of incumbent firms) and potential entrants' cost conditions. If there are economies of scale in production, or if entrants are cost disadvantaged, established firms can raise their preentry output level up to the point where entry is effectively deterred. By its nature this framework compresses firms' long-run entry and size decisions and their short-run production and pricing decisions into the same period. Later models of entry deterrence (e.g. Dixit (1979)) have formally separated these two decision periods, and have argued that the threat to maintain output at the pre-entry level is not subgame perfect.
Our paper differs from most previous analyses of entry deterrence in its assumptions regarding competition in the post-entry game. Spence (1977) assumes that the post-entry game is perfectly competitive, i.e. that price clears all capacity from the market. Dixit (1980 ), Spulber (1981 , Ware (1985) and Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) examine the case where the post-entry game is Cournot. Spulber (1981) , Saloner (1985) and Basu and Singh (1990) examine entry when the post-entry game is Stackelberg quantity-setting.
Post-entry Bertrand competition has remained relatively neglected. Dixit (1980) and Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) examine Bertrand competition in the final stage in a differentiated products model. Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985, p. 181) note that with homogeneous goods, final stage price-setting leads to marginal cost pricing and, therefore, if the entrant's constant marginal costs are at least as great as the incumbent's and if there is a fixed cost of entry "we would never expect to observe entry followed by price competition." 3 Our paper demonstrates that this conclusion is an artifact of a modelling strategy which allows capacity to be instantaneously adjusted upward in the post-entry game. Borrowing terminology from the real business cycles literature (see Kydland and Prescott (1982) ), we call this assumption no time to build . This assumption is maintained in both the Dixit and BGK models (as in most of the other models above). 4 While its implications are innocuous for quantitysetting games, this is not true for post-entry price-setting, as noted by Edgeworth (1925) . Our paper departs from these previous attempts to deal with post-entry price-setting by assuming that capacity requires time to build . Specifically, we assume that the incumbent and entrant may sequentially precommit to capacity levels. However, once these capacities are in place there is no upward adjustment in the post-entry stage. 5 Prices are set subject to the limitations on sales imposed by the capacity constraints.
The Bertrand-Edgeworth approach to modelling post-entry competition is appealing for several reasons. First, it is immune to the Bertrand critique; firms set prices. This avoids the Cournot model's reliance on the hypothetical auctioneer who sets prices to clear quantities in the market. Moreover, for most markets a strong intuitive argument can be made that prices are more easily adjusted than quantities, and hence can be set contingent on the quantities available.
This leads naturally to a model where price formation is the final stage of a multistage game.
A common defense of the Cournot model is based on the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) argument that simultaneous quantity choice followed by simultaneous price-setting can yield a Cournot outcome. 6 However, there is a growing consensus among theoreticians that the choice of a quantity in the Cournot model should be interpreted as a level of capital investment or scale of operation. 7 It therefore seems inappropriate to appeal to the Kreps-Scheinkman result to justify post-entry Cournot competition in a model in which capital may be precommitted. A more natural approach is to replace the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) assumption of simultaneous capacity choice by sequential precommitment in the choice of capacity.
The Bertrand-Edgeworth approach to modelling post-entry competition also has another, hitherto largely unnoticed, advantage over the no time to build approach: when fixed entry costs are either nonexistent or not too large, the latter approach is incapable of generating a firstmover advantage from capacity precommitment . Indeed, consider Dixit's (1980) analysis, in which an incumbent (firm 1) and a potential entrant (firm 2) sell imperfect substitutes. After the incumbent chooses a capacity level k 1 , firm 2 decides whether or not to enter. In the event entry occurs, both firms simultaneously announce a price and expand capacity to satisfy any demand that can be profitably sold at these prices. 8 The situation is depicted in Figure 1 . The two curves MM′ and NN′ represent the incumbent's best response functions, the former when capacity costs matter and the latter when capacity costs are sunk. The curve EE′ is the potential 6 See, however, Davidson and Deneckere (1986) who show that this result is sensitive to the choice of rationing rule, and Deneckere and Kovenock (1989b) who show that, even with the rationing rule used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , the equivalence need not hold with different unit costs of production up to capacity. Moreover, as Allen and Hellwig (1986) show, simultaneous price and quantity choices do not, in general, lead to Cournot outcomes under proportional rationing.
7 For instance, Shapiro (1990) , referring to Kreps and Scheinkman , states "They take the view, to which I adhere, that capital is a relatively sluggish variable, whereas prices can be adjusted rapidly. This leads to a model of capacity competition followed by pricing competition. " Tirole (1988, p. 217) represents all (p 1 , p 2 ) combinations at which the incumbent's demand is equal to k 1 , i.e. where the incumbent is capacity constrained unless he expands beyond k 1 . The overall best-response function of the incumbent in the post-entry game is therefore represented by the heavy line in Figure 1 . With the choice of k 1 as depicted, the second stage equilibrium would occur at T′. By varying the pre-entry choice of k 1 , the incumbent can secure any point along the segment TV of the potential entrant's best-response function. This leads Dixit (1980, p. 105) to mistakenly conclude that "a limited leadership possibility arise(s) by virtue of the established firm's advantage in being the first to make a commitment to capacity." Indeed, in the analogous quantity-setting game which he analyses earlier, the leadership possibility is limited because the line segment TV may not include the Stackelberg point S. In that case V is the incumbent's most preferred outcome. For the price-setting game, the Stackelberg point can be found by superimposing the incumbent's isoprofit contours onto Figure 1 ; see Figure 2 . Since S lies to the right of T, 9 the most preferred outcome on the segment TV now occurs at the duopoly point T.
In contrast to Dixit, we conclude that in differentiated product price-setting games with no time to build, the ability to sink investment costs confers no strategic advantage to the incumbent .
Intuitively, the incumbent would like to precommit to a capacity below the duopoly level in order to soften the post-entry competition. 10 With no time to build, a commitment to restrict capacity to the Stackelberg level is not credible, and the best the incumbent can do is enjoy duopoly profits. It should also be emphasized that while the above result was derived under the 9 At the point T, the first order effect on the incumbent's profits of increasing p 1 is zero, but the first order effect of an increase in p 2 is positive. Consequently S must be to the right of T.
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This is the "puppy dog" effect emphasized by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) .
assumption of zero fixed entry costs, the reasoning remains valid as long as the profits of firm 2 at the point V -net of fixed entry costs -are positive.
The Bertrand-Edgeworth approach to strategic entry deterrence is also appealing because of the array of qualitatively distinct outcomes that are generated as subgame perfect equilibria in the resulting game. Entry may be blockaded, deterred, or accommodated, depending on the configuration of costs. In cases where entry is successfully deterred, excessive capacity built to deter entry may be utilized completely or may be left partially idle. 11 That is, the equilibrium price of the incumbent may or may not clear its entire production capacity from the market, depending on the cost parameters.
The existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium involving idle capacity to deter entry is of independent interest. While a number of models in the existing literature obtain idle capacity to deter entry, these models all rely on nonstandard assumptions concerning behavior or timing. Spence (1977) obtains idle capacity, but assumes that firms produce at full capacity in the postentry game. Such behavior can only be justified if the post-entry game is perfectly competitive, an assumption which seems at odds with the small number of competitors present in the market.
Indeed, Dixit (1980) has argued that Spence's result arises because entrants believe noncredible threats regarding the incumbent's post-entry output. When an opponent enters the market, his increase in quantity or reduction in price produces an inward shift in the incumbent's residual demand curve. The incumbent then responds rationally by reducing his output. Consequently, any capacity that was idle before entry will remain idle after entry, and so will not deter entry.
Since capacity costs are positive, no rational incumbent will ever choose to install idle capacity. Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) regain idle capacity in an example in which only credible threats are believed. However, they require that the monopolist's residual demand function becomes sufficiently more elastic upon entry that his marginal revenue increases. This will make it rational for the incumbent to raise output in the post-entry game. However, upward
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By excessive capacity, we mean capacity that is built solely for strategic reasons, i.e. capacity in excess of the level a monopolist would choose were his market unchallenged. sloping portions in the quantity best-response function cannot occur for concave demand functions. Lastly, Spulber (1981) has demonstrated that idle capacity may result if the incumbent maintains his first-mover advantage beyond the capacity-setting period into the (postentry) output-setting period. 12 Unlike any of the above papers, the present paper provides an explanation of why holding idle capacity to deter entry can be rational, while maintaining a postentry simultaneous move structure, subgame perfection, and standard assumptions about demand. In our model, idle capacity may prove useful because, in the mixed strategy equilibrium which results following entry, the incumbent only reduces output when he is undercut by the entrant. Whenever the incumbent is lower priced, he raises output, thereby partially utilizing his idle capacity and reducing the entrant's expected profits.
When entry is accommodated in our model, the incumbent may behave according to the Sylos Postulate, so that price is driven down to the level that clears all capacity, or he may provide a stochastic price umbrella under which the entrant can price. In the latter instance, the incumbent stochastically reduces output below capacity. 13 Following Faith (1990) we provide conditions on the cost parameters that determine which strategy the incumbent follows. When prices clear production capacities, the classical Stackelberg equilibrium sometimes arises. In other cases, the outcome duplicates the equilibria in Dixit's (1980) quantity-setting model.
When entry is accommodated by a (stochastic) reduction in output, the result may best be described as a simultaneous price-setting version of Gelman and Salop's (1983) "judo" equilibrium. The incumbent sets a large capacity and the entrant remains small to discourage
12
This method of generating idle capacity to deter entry was rediscovered by Basu and Singh (1990). 13 When in equilibrium entry is successfully deterred, this type of behavior is also exhibited in off-the equilibrium-path subgames following entry. When entry is deterred with excessive but not idle capacity, off the equilibrium path post-entry behavior may involve either Sylos-like behavior or stochastic output reduction (below capacity). When idle capacity is held in deterring entry, off the equilibrium path entry will involve only stochastic output reduction below capacity. intense price competition. 14 By relating the existence of the Stackelberg and judo outcomes to the values of the cost parameters, our model provides a unifying framework in which these outcomes appear as special cases.
As is evident from the above discussion, the Bertrand-Edgeworth model is also of interest because of the wealth of testable implications that it generates. Not surprisingly, entry is accommodated when fixed set up costs and differences in variable production cost (as measured by the unit costs of production up to capacity) are small. For high capacity costs, entry accommodation will result in Stackelberg behavior while for low capacity costs, judo-like behavior with idle capacity will arise. Entry deterrence with excessive capacity tends to occur when the unit cost of capacity is not too large and there are moderate fixed set up costs. 15 In both situations in which entry is deterred and accommodated, idle capacity is more likely with a more efficient incumbent than with a less efficient one (as measured by unit cost of production up to capacity) and is more likely the lower the cost of capacity. Excessive (but fully utilized) capacity is more likely to be chosen as a preemptive strategy the higher the cost of capacity and the higher fixed set up costs.
This list of testable implications is intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. The This may occur even if the entrant is more efficient (see also Faith (1990) ).
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When capacity costs are large, entry is more likely to be accommodated (if fixed set up costs are small) or blockaded (if fixed set up costs are large). The range of fixed set up costs for which entry is deterred becomes small.
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One such extension is Hunsaker's (1993) treatment of the theory of exit. Another extension which appears accessible at this point is a theory of entry deterrence with multiple incumbents.
In Section 2 we present the basic model. Post-entry price-setting subgames are examined in Section 3. Section 4 uses the analysis of section 3 to construct the potential entrant's capacity best response function for different cost configurations. Then Section 5 examines the incumbent's capacity choice and the qualitative nature of the resulting equilibria. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous good in which two firms, an incumbent (firm 1) and an entrant (firm 2), sequentially set capacities k i (i = 1,2) , after which they simultaneously choose prices p i (i = 1,2) . At the capacity-setting stage firms incur a lump-sum fixed set up cost, F, that can be avoided only if zero capacity is installed. In addition, there is a constant per unit cost of capacity, r. Hence, both firms have an identical cost of capacity function, defined as:
In the final price-setting stage firm i incurs a constant unit cost of production up to the capacity limit k i . We denote this cost by c i . Thus, if firm i's realized sales at the price-setting stage are q i ² k i , its variable cost of production is equal to
Output greater than a firm's capacity is assumed to be infinitely costly.
Summing the cost of capacity (1) and the cost of production up to capacity (2) yields the cost structure commonly used in the examination of entry deterrence. (See, for example, Dixit (1980).) We explicitly separate these two costs in order to highlight the distinction between the cost of capacity, which is sunk before the final price-setting stage, and the cost of production, which depends on realized sales at the pricing stage.
Aggregate market demand is assumed to be of the form
Linear demand permits closed form solutions for the equilibrium in the price-setting subgames.
It also provides an important benchmark for gauging the relative importance of the regions of the parameter space {c 1 , c 2 , r, F} over which different types of preemptive behavior are observed. The qualitative results of our model would be similar, however, if instead demand were assumed to be concave.
Because sharp capacity constraints limit the amount of output that can be supplied, firms may have to ration customers at the prices they select. Following Levitan and Shubik (1972) and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , we assume that demand is rationed efficiently. Thus, if p i < p j , firm i sells min(k i , d(p i )) and firm j faces a residual demand equal to max(0, d(p j ) -k i ).
This means that items are sold first to those consumers having the highest willingness to pay if we assume that total demand is generated by a continuum of agents who purchase at most a single unit of an indivisible good. 17 When firms set identical prices, we assume that all demand first flows to the low cost firm, and that the high cost firm serves any residual demand. To break ties when c 1 = c 2 we arbitrarily let firm 1 sell its capacity first. 18 With this rationing rule, and ignoring sunk set up and capacity costs, the profit to firm i in the price-setting subgame when it sets p i and firm j sets p j is 17 Alternatively, with elastic individual demand such a rule would result if there were an efficient resale market among consumers.
18
Any alternative division of sales when firms choose identical prices (such as making them proportional to capacity) would generate the same equilibrium profits in the pricing subgame, as shown in Deneckere and Kovenock (1989b, Proposition 3) . In the analysis that follows, we rule out strategies in which firms price below their unit production costs. 19 Let, S i = [c i ,1] denote the pure strategy set of firm i and write Σ i for the corresponding set of mixed strategies (the set of cumulative distribution functions F i on S i ).
The profit function ¹ i extends in a natural way to an expected profit function on Σ 1 × Σ 2 . For any quadruple of capacities and costs (k 1 ,k 2 ,c 1 ,c 2 ) the price-setting subgame is then a normal form game G(k 1 ,k 2 ,c 1 ,c 2 ), with players i=1,2, strategy sets Σ i , and expected payoff functions
In Section 3 we demonstrate that there is a unique Nash equilibrium pair of payoffs in the game G(k 1 ,k 2 ,c 1 ,c 2 ), denoted by ¹ * i (k 1 ,k 2 ,c 1 ,c 2 ) for i=1,2. Since we are interested in the subgame perfect equilibria only, the three-stage game of sequential capacity choice followed by simultaneous price-setting can be reduced to a game of sequential capacity choice with payoffs
We call this game Γ(c 1 ,c 2 ,r,F). Throughout the continuation we mostly ignore trivial cases associated with drastic cost advantages by assuming that c i < (1 + c j + r)/2, i = 1,2, j _ i.
Let the inverse demand function corresponding to (3) be denoted by P(q) = max {0, 1-q}.
In analyzing the game Γ, we often need to refer to best response functions in the quantity-setting game with inverse demand function P(q) and various cost functions. Let Q We therefore rule out any weakly dominated strategy that is not the limit of a sequence of undominated strategies.
-ρ(q)] be the best-response functions corresponding to the cost functions c i q, (c i + r)q, and c i q + ρ(q), respectively. More precisely: 20 
The Price-Setting Subgames
We now derive Nash equilibrium profits in the price-setting subgame G(k 1 ,k 2 ,c 1 ,c 2 ).
For a more complete treatment see Deneckere and Kovenock (1989a, b) , which shows that, except in cases where the high cost firm makes zero profits, equilibrium strategies are uniquely determined.
To describe equilibrium profits note that, for some ranges of costs and capacities, equilibrium exists in pure strategies, while in other regions, equilibrium requires nondegenerate 20 Note that we have assumed that the best response function Q F i is left continuous; this ensures that in a Stackelberg game the leader can always attain the supremum of his profits, so that an equilibrium exists. In region B = B 1 ∪ B 2 ∪ B 3 ∪ B 4 , the equilibrium involves nondegenerate mixed strategies. The derivation of equilibrium expected profits follows a simple procedure. Note first that firm i makes at least as much profit when it is the low-priced firm as when it is high-priced.
Hence, firm i can guarantee itself a minimax profit of H
by charging the price which maximizes its profit under the assumption that it is the high-priced firm, p
. 21 This implies that, in equilibrium, firm i never charges a price at which it receives a profit less than H * i when it is the low-priced firm. More specifically, firm i never charges a price less
Any price below p i is payoff-dominated by charging p H i .
To distinguish between the two firms in region B, suppose that p j ² p i . Then firm j knows that it is never undercut at prices below p i . Since L j (p) is increasing on the interval below p i neither firm ever charges a price below p i . We may summarize the behavior outside the pure strategy region A as follows: When p 1 > p 2 , firm 1 prices passively by providing a stochastic price umbrella for firm 2. 23 Consequently, here we have π 
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We use the term aggressive pricing to indicate that a firm undercuts its rival with sufficiently high probability so as to keep that rival at its minimax profit level. The rival, which allows itself to be undercut sufficiently often, is then said to price passively.
holds if and only if k 1 > k 2 , so that large firms price passively and small firms price aggressively. When c 1 > c 2 , the region where p 1 > p 2 strictly includes the region where k 1 > k 2 ; when c 1 < c 2 the opposite is true. Thus, as is emphasized in Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) , high costs induce more passive pricing behavior.
Capacity Best Response Functions
Before proceeding with the derivation of the follower's best response function in the game Γ(c 1 ,c 2 ,r,F), we would like to provide some intuition for why and how this best response function differs from the standard quantity best response function in the Cournot and Stackelberg models. The distinction between our capacity best response and the standard quantity best response emanates from the following observation: In quantity-setting models a quantity placed on the market is a commitment to drive price down to the level that clears all quantity from the market. In the three-stage game of sequential capacity choice followed by simultaneous price-setting capacity is not a commitment to drive price down to the capacity clearing level.
This fact has two major implications. First, when firms' costs are not too dissimilar and for capacities outside of the region under the lower envelope of the Cournot best response functions Q c i (k j ) , the larger firm acts relatively passively in pricing. 24 This provides an incentive for a follower to set a capacity above the quantity best response function when the leader's capacity is sufficiently large. In this range, the gain from the follower's expansion of capacity beyond the level corresponding to the quantity best response is only partially offset by a (stochastic) price reduction.
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As shown in Section 3, this statement is literally true when the larger firm is equally or less efficient than its opponent. When the large firm is more efficient (e.g., c 1 < c 2 ), the statement also holds true in the region where p 1 > p 2 . This suffices for our purposes, as firm 2's quantity best response function is entirely contained in this region whenever (k 1 ,k 2 ) ∉ A.
The second major implication is that firms whose efficiency considerably exceeds that of their rivals act more aggressively in setting capacity than they would in quantity-setting games.
Efficient followers need not take their rival's capacity as a commitment to sell. Instead, they may decide to increase their own capacity to accommodate all of the demand at their rival's unit cost of production and proceed to price the rival completely out of the market. Hence, Bertrand behavior may displace Cournot behavior.
The potential for this type of aggressive response has an important effect on the behavior of a leader with high unit production costs. Such a firm will restrict its capacity in order to render it optimal for the more efficient firm to restrict capacity and price passively rather than to expand capacity and price aggressively.
In the analysis that follows, we characterize the parameter values that delineate these two types of behavior. From the equilibrium profits Π i (k 1 , k 2 | c 1 , c 2 , r, F) of the price-setting subgames, we can calculate the optimal capacity choice of the follower in the second stage of our three-stage game: Since the follower's profits are nonincreasing in k 1 , and since a fixed set up cost does not affect the best response capacity unless profits become nonpositive, R(k 1 ) coincides with R 0 (k 1 ) below a critical value of the leader's capacity: 25
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Following Dixit, we assume that whenever the follower is indifferent between entering and staying out of the market, no entry occurs. More generally, whenever the follower's best response correspondence is multiple valued we assume that the follower takes the action that maximizes the leader's profit. This ensures that the leader's first-stage profit function Π 1 (k 1 ,R(k 1 )|c 1 ,c 2 ,r,F) is upper semicontinuous, so that an equilibrium always exists.
The critical value k m is defined by 26 k m (c 1 , c 2 , r, F) = max {k 1 : Π 2 (k 1 , R 0 (k 1 ) | c 1 , c 2 , r, 0) ³ F}.
Because of this simple relationship between R(k 1 ) and R 0 (k 1 ), we will first assume (in order to simplify our presentation) that F = 0 and study how R 0 (k 1 ) depends on the remaining parameters c 1 , c 2 , and r. Figure 5 illustrates the different cases that may arise. We adopt the following conventions in the definition of k m : if the set over which k 1 is being maximized is empty, then k m (c 1 , c 2 , r, F) = 0. If the set is equal to R + , then k m (c 1 , c 2 , r, F) = ∞. Note that the former case occurs when F is sufficiently large, and the latter case occurs when c 2 is not too much larger than c 1 and F is sufficiently small. r < (1 -2c 2 + c 1 )/2 then insures that there exists _ k 2 > 0 such that Π 2 = π * 2 -rk 2 > 0 for k 2 ∈ (0, _ k 2 ), regardless of the value of k 1 . As in Gelman and Salop (1983) , by choosing a sufficiently small but positive capacity, the follower can guarantee that the leader does not find it profitable to drive the follower out of the market in the price-setting subgame. The leader then prefers to provide a stochastic price umbrella for his relatively small rival, rather than to lower his price sufficiently far so as to make it impossible for the rival to obtain any profitable sales.
To be more specific, define the judo capacity of firm 2 by λ 2 (c 1 , c 2 , r) ≡ arg max Π 2 (k 1 , k 2 )}.
In Proposition 3, the follower's cost advantage is then sufficiently large and the cost of capacity sufficiently low, so that driving the leader out of the market in the price setting subgame is optimal whenever k 1 exceeds some critical level k u . Note that under the assumptions of 
Entry Accommodation and Deterrence
The analysis of the follower's best response function in Section 4 now allows us to examine the optimal choice of capacity by the leader and thus the potential for entry deterrence.
The leader chooses the capacity k 1 that maximizes the profit Π 1 (k 1 , R(k 1 )|c 1 , c 2 , r, F) obtained when the follower responds with R(k 1 ). Following Bain (1956) we distinguish between capacity choices for which entry is accommodated, blockaded, or deterred. Entry is said to be accommodated if the capacity choice of the incumbent is such that the optimal response of the follower is to choose a positive capacity. Entry is blockaded if the incumbent's monopoly capacity Q r 1 (0) for unit cost c 1 + r, i.e. the capacity it would set in the absence of the threat of entry, suffices to induce the follower to respond with zero capacity and hence stay out of the market. Entry is deterred if it is optimal for the incumbent to strategically set a capacity greater than Q r 1 (0) in order to induce the follower to respond by setting zero capacity.
Depending on the assumed values of the cost parameters, our model obtains a wide range of qualitatively distinct outcomes in the three stage game. Entry is accommodated when the fixed set up cost F is sufficiently small given the differences (which cannot be drastic) in the unit costs of production up to capacity, and the cost of capacity. In the case of accommodated entry the incumbent may behave according to the Sylos postulate, so that price is driven down to a level that clears all capacity, or it may provide a stochastic price umbrella under which the entrant can pick prices. The cost of capacity and the unit costs of production up to capacity determine which outcome occurs. For high capacity costs, entry accommodation (when it occurs) leads to Stackelberg behavior. For low capacity costs, the nature of equilibrium depends on unit production cost asymmetries. Judo-like behavior arises if the incumbent has the lower cost of production or if he is not too cost disadvantaged. In judo equilibrium, the incumbent sets a large capacity, the entrant a small capacity, and a nondegenerate mixed strategy arises at the price-setting stage. In this equilibrium the incumbent sets higher prices on average than the entrant, and both stochastically reduce output below capacity. When capacity costs are low and the incumbent is sufficiently cost disadvantaged, the incumbent must reduce its capacity below the Stackelberg level to avoid facing an aggressive capacity response by the entrant and hence the possibility of being driven out of the market at the price-setting stage. The entrant, firm 2, responds by setting capacity along Q r 2 (k 1 ) , so that in equilibrium both firms produce at full capacity. We call this type of outcome a "reverse judo" result. and the Stackelberg levels k s i (r,r) , i=1,2. These correspond to the equilibria in Dixit's (1980) quantity-setting model.
Figures 6a and 6b show the qualitatively distinct ranges of accommodating equilibria as the difference in the unit production costs of the two firms and the cost of capacity vary. Figure   6a illustrates the nature of equilibrium as a function of r and c 1 , holding F = c 2 = 0. In this case the entrant is cost advantaged. Figure 6b illustrates the type of equilibrium as a function of r and c 2 , holding F = c 1 = 0. In this case the incumbent is cost advantaged.
To understand how to match the qualitative information contained in these pictures with the analysis of the capacity best response functions in the previous section, consider Figure 6a .
When c 1 = r = 0, firm 2's best response function is given by Proposition 2, as illustrated in sufficiently large, however, k u < k C 1 (c,r) , and firm 2's best response function is as indicated in Figure 5e . Firm 1 then optimizes by choosing k 1 = k u , resulting in a reverse judo equilibrium.
As c 1 further increases, k u converges to zero, eventually yielding firm 2 a monopoly position.
If we start at the origin of Figure 6a , but instead gradually raise r, then as argued above the equilibrium is initially of the judo type. As r is increased, R 0 (k 1 ) shifts down, and k Since capacity costs are zero, values of k 1 exceeding k J are also optimal. However, such responses necessarily disappear when r becomes even slightly positive, and we therefore ignore them in our discussion. equilibria similar to the quantity-setting equilibria advocated by Dixit (1980) , with stochastic price-setting versions of the judo equilibria presented in Gelman and Salop (1983) , or with the reverse judo equilibria of Deneckere and Kovenock (1989) and Faith (1990) . Which of these qualitatively distinct equilibria arises is determined by unit cost asymmetries and the cost of capacity.
Entry is deterred in our model when the fixed cost F is sufficiently large to make deterrence more profitable than accommodation, but sufficiently small so as to preclude blockaded entry. When entry is successfully deterred, excessive capacity built to deter entry may be utilized completely or may be left partially idle. Hence, unlike previous papers in the literature, our model provides support for the use of idle capacity to deter entry, while maintaining a post-entry simultaneous move structure, subgame perfection, and standard assumptions on demand (such as linearity). Idle capacity is more likely with a more efficient incumbent than a less efficient one (as measured by unit cost of production up to capacity) and is more likely the lower the cost of capacity. Excessive, but fully utilized, capacity is more likely to be chosen as a preemptive strategy the higher the cost of capacity and the higher the fixed set up costs.
To illustrate the type of outcomes that might arise consider the four capacity best response functions R(k 1 ) shown in Figure 7 . These represent best response functions for c 1 = 0, c 2 = 0, and r = .05. Figure 7a shows a case where the fixed cost F is less than Π 2 (k J , λ 2 |c 1 , c 2 , r, 0) and entry is accommodated. The cost of capacity and the fixed cost are sufficiently small that a judo outcome arises in which the leader sets a large capacity, the follower a small capacity, and the leader provides a stochastic price umbrella under which the When entry is deterred, for any (r,F) pair for which idle capacity arises there is an r′>r such that (r′,F) generates excessive but not idle capacity to deter entry. Correspondingly, for r>0 there is an F′>F such that (r,F′) generates excessive but not idle capacity. The range of (r,F) pairs for which entry is deterred with excessive but not idle capacity lies to the north and east of the idle capacity range in (r,F) space.
For general (c 1 ,c 2 ,r) triples, when the cost of capacity is sufficiently large, entry deterring equilibria correspond to those of the Stackelberg model and hence never involve idle capacity. Entry deterrence with idle capacity requires that the incumbent set a capacity greater than Q c 1 (0) , which is never profitable for r large enough to generate a Proposition 1 best response function, R 0 (k 1 ). A necessary condition for idle capacity to arise in entry deterrence is that R 0 (k 1 ) be a Proposition 2 or 3 best response function. For Proposition 2 best response functions, idle capacity to deter entry requires k m ∈(Q 
Conclusion
Since its inception oligopoly theory has relied heavily on quantity-setting models of competition. With the emphasis on extensive form modelling of oligopoly games that coincided with the birth of the "new theoretical industrial organization", the timing of firms' strategic choices received more scrutiny. The basic observation that firms set prices as well as quantities calls into question the use of the Cournot model as a reasonable reduced form for a more complicated process of strategic interaction. In a seminal paper, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) showed that it was possible to obtain the Cournot outcome as a reduced form for a more complicated process of simultaneous capacity setting followed by simultaneous price-setting.
This framework had popular appeal because it separated the quantity and pricing decisions of firms and made the intuitively appealing assumption (at least for many markets) that prices can more easily be set contingent on capacities than vice versa. At the same time the approach lent guarded support for the use of the Cournot equilibrium in modelling market behavior under imperfect competition. This paper takes the Bertrand-Edgeworth philosophy a step further by attempting to apply the approach to one of the fundamental theoretical issues of industrial organization, the profitability of credible precommitment to deter entry. In doing so we provide a new and intuitive answer to the question addressed in the literature on entry deterrence of whether it is desirable to hold idle capacity to deter entry. We also provide a unified framework in which several qualitatively distinct outcomes (some of which have been proposed previously in the literature) appear as special cases.
To understand the origins of this chameleon-like character of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model, it is useful to examine how the degree of post-entry competition influences the outcome of the capacity precommitment game. Price-taking behavior in the post-entry game provides an interesting benchmark, because it appears at one extreme of the behavioral spectrum. With equal marginal production costs, perfectly competitive pricing also ensures that firms will produce at full capacity in the post-entry game. Vigorous post-entry competition thus renders the outcomes favored by Sylos-Labini (1969) and Spence (1977) immune to the Dixit (1979) critique. 30 Another alternative that merits attention is post-entry quantity competition, if only because this case has figured so prominently in the entry deterrence literature. To see why the Bertrand-Edgeworth model sometimes takes on the character of the perfectly competitive pricing model, at other times mimics the behavior of the quantity-setting model, and at still other times produces behavior which has no equivalent in either model, it is useful to compare the respective capacity best response functions. Figure 14a illustrates the case of a more efficient leader, with parameter configurations such that the equilibrium falls in the 30 One paper that models competition in this way is Dixon (1985) . 31 As shown by Ware (1985) , Dixit's assumption that the entrant and incumbent simultaneously select their output in the second stage of the game is not innocuous. This assumption allows the incumbent to precommit to output before the entrant has committed its capacity. Ware shows that in a three-stage game the possibilities for deterrence are more limited than Dixit suggests. Outcomes close to the point V in Dixit's diagram are eliminated because the entrant can select a capacity slightly above the quantity best response function and induce the incumbent to produce below capacity in the quantity-setting subgame.
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Note that it is not merely the case that whenever the two other modes of competition agree in their predictions the Bertrand-Edgeworth model concurs. Indeed, in Figure 6b , judo behavior displaces an area of common Stackelberg behavior in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 13 . judo region of Figure 6b (but below the continuation of the upper boundary of the Dixit region).
As explained in Section 5, with Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, judo behavior displaces quantity-setting behavior because to the right of the point V, capacity increases by firm 1 serve only to reduce firm 2's post-entry profit. Under quantity competition, such expansion has no effect, because it will never be used in the post-entry game. The follower thus responds less aggressively under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition than under Cournot competition. In this case, the Bertrand-Edgeworth model deters entry more effectively than the quantity-setting model. 33 Figure 14a also reveals that the Sylos postulate and price-taking behavior result in identical capacity best response functions. However, the outcomes under both modes of behavior do not coincide. The Sylos postulate produces the Stackelberg outcome, while pricetaking behavior results in entry being deterred, with the incumbent holding idle capacity. The reason for this discrepancy is that with price-taking behavior the incumbent's profits are not continuous at k 2 =0: in the absence of entry, the incumbent can produce at the monopoly level, whereas small scale entry forces him to utilize all available capacity. As a result, the incumbent's behavior under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition is less aggressive than under pricetaking behavior. A comparison with the outcome under the Sylos postulate is ambiguous. 34 33 When capacity costs are sufficiently high, expansion to the judo point is no longer optimal; the incumbent then behaves as in Dixit's model. One of the surprising results of our paper is that it is never optimal for the incumbent to choose a capacity strictly between k C 1 (c,r) and k J 1 when F=0. Intuitively, this is because for low capacity costs the discontinuity in the best response function makes it optimal to expand to k J 1 , while for high capacity costs the marginal benefit of expansion inside region B 3 exceeds the marginal cost. 34 As illustrated in Figure 14a , judo behavior may lead to more aggressive incumbent behavior than under the Sylos postulate. However, the area of the judo region to the right of the dashed line in Figure 6b We conclude that price-taking and quantity setting behavior sometimes lead to plausible market outcomes. When the outcomes under these post-entry modes of competition differ from those under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, we believe that the Bertrand-Edgeworth approach provides a more appealing description of firm behavior.
Compared to the Bertrand-Edgeworth model post-entry price-taking generally leads to implausibly aggressive incumbent behavior. 36 Price-taking behavior allows the incumbent greater precommitment to aggressive pricing and therefore entails more passive entrant behavior. 35 An example of such an industry is steel, where low cost minimills have displaced higher cost incumbents in all but the highest quality steel markets. However, when the entrant has a sufficiently large cost advantage the incumbent behaves implausibly aggressively under Cournot competition. The incumbent is committed to sell its quantity even if this would drive the price below its variable cost. Under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition the entrant can price below the incumbent's variable cost without facing this incredible threat, i.e., can eliminate competition from its high-cost rival.
We conclude that the Bertrand-Edgeworth model takes on the virtues of the quantitysetting and price-taking models without inheriting their vices. By illustrating the benefits of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model, we hope to stimulate further examination of its implications for the organization of industry. We have little doubt that this will remain a fruitful area of inquiry.
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In Dixit's (1980) model capacity expansion beyond the point k C 1 (c,r) does not affect the postentry outcome.
